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Abstract. Differential privacy is a de facto standard in data privacy
with applications in the private and public sectors. Most of the tech-
niques that achieve differential privacy are based on a judicious use of
randomness. However, reasoning about randomized programs is difficult
and error prone. For this reason, several techniques have been recently
proposed to support designer in proving programs differentially private
or in finding violations to it.
In this work we propose a technique based on symbolic execution for
reasoning about differential privacy. Symbolic execution is a classic tech-
nique used for testing, counterexample generation and to prove absence of
bugs. Here we use symbolic execution to support these tasks specifically
for differential privacy. To achieve this goal, we leverage two ideas that
have been already proven useful in formal reasoning about differential
privacy: relational reasoning and probabilistic coupling. Our technique
integrates these two ideas and shows how such a combination can be
used to both verify and find violations to differential privacy.
1 Introduction
Differential Privacy [17] has become a de facto gold standard definition of pri-
vacy for statistical analysis. This success is mostly due to the generality of the
definition, its robustness and compositionality. These valuable properties helped
researchers from many different communities - e.g. machine learning, data analy-
sis, and security - in coming up with differentially private algorithms for specific
goals. However, it was quickly understood that getting differential privacy right
in practice is a hard task. Even privacy experts have released fragile code subject
to attacks [2,11,18,22,30] and published incorrect algorithms [28]. This challenge
has motivated the programming language community to develop techniques to
support programmer to show their algorithms differentially private. Among the
techniques that have been proposed there are type systems [4,7,20,31,33,37,38],
methods based on model checking and Markov chains [3, 12–14, 27, 35], and
program logics [5, 6, 8, 9, 34]. More recently, the formal methods community
have also focused on developing techniques to find violations to differential pri-
vacy [3, 10,16].
Most of these works focus on either verifying a program differentially private
or finding violations to differential privacy and they do not consider techniques
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supporting both kind of reasoning. An exception is the recent work by Barthe et
al. [3] which proposes a method based on a decidable logic for a simple while lan-
guage over finite input and output domains, that can be used for both verifying
and finding violation to differential privacy.
Motivated by this picture, we propose a new technique based on relational
symbolic execution, named Coupled Relational Symbolic Execution (CRSE),
which supports proving and finding violation to differential privacy for programs.
Our technique is based on two essential ingredients: the use of a recently intro-
duced notion of relational symbolic execution [19] and the use of approximate
probabilistic couplings [8] to reason about differential privacy a relational way.
This approach allow us also to support reasoning over countable input and out-
put domains.
Relational Symbolic Execution. Symbolic execution is a classic technique
used for bug finding, testing and proving. In symbolic execution an evaluator
executes the program which consumes symbolic inputs instead of concrete ones.
The evaluator follows, potentially, all the execution paths the program could
take and collects constraints over the symbolic values, corresponding to these
paths. The evaluator collects in this way a description of the traces in terms
of constraints on symbolic values or expressions involving them. Every trace is
associated with a set of constraints and every input satisfiying these constraints
will lead the actual concrete execution along that trace.
Similarly, in relational symbolic execution [19] (RSE) one is concerned with
bug finding, testing, or proving for relational properties. These are properties
about two executions of two potentially different programs. RSE executes two
potentially different programs in a symbolic fashion. RSE exploits relational as-
sumptions about the two inputs to the two programs in order to reduce the num-
ber of states to analyze. This can be particularly effective when the codes of the
two programs share some similarities, and when the property under consideration
is relational in nature, as in the case of differential privacy. Approximate
Probabilistic Couplings. Probabilistic coupling [26] is a proof technique useful
to relate two random variables through a common joint probability distribution.
Probabilistic coupling has been used in formal verification [24] to lift a relation
over the joint support of two probability distribution to a relation over the two
probability distributions themselves. This allows one to reason about relations
between probability distributions by reasoning about relations on their support,
which can be usually done in a symbolic way. In this approach the actual prob-
abilistic reasoning is confined to the soundness of the verification system, rather
than being spread everywhere. A relaxation of the notion of coupling, called
approximate probabilistic coupling [8, 9], has been designed to reason about dif-
ferential privacy. This can be seen as a regular probabilistic coupling with some
additional parameter describing how close the two probability distribution are.
In this work, we combine these two approaches in a framework called Coupled
Relational Symbolic Execution (CRSE). In this framework, a program is executed
in a relational and symbolic way. When some probabilistic primitive is executed,
CRSE introduces constraints corresponding to the existence of an approximate
probabilistic coupling on the output. These constraints are combined with the
constraints on the execution traces generated by symbolically and relationally
executing other non-probabilistic commands. These combined constraints can
be exploited to reduce the number of states to analyze. When the execution is
concluded CRSE checks whether there is a coupling between the two outputs, or
whether there is some violation to the coupling. We show the soundness of this
approach for both proving and refuting differential privacy. However, for finding
violations, one cannot reason only symbolically, and since checking directly a
coupling can be computationally expensive, we devise several heuristic which
can be used to facilitate this task. Using these techniques, CRSE allows one
to verifying differential privacy for an interesting class of programs, including
programs working on countable input and output domains, and to find violations
to programs that are not differentially private.
As we discussed at the begin of this section, other techniques have been
devised to achieve similar goals. CRSE is not a replacement for them but it
should be seen as an additional method to put in the set of tools of the privacy
developer which provides an high level of generality. Indeed, by being a totally
symbolic technique, it can leverage on a pletora of current technologies such as
SMT solvers, e.g. [15], algebraic solvers, e.g. [23], and numeric solvers, e.g. [29].
Summarizing, the contribution of our work are:
– We combine relational symbolic execution and approximate probabilistic
coupling in a new technique, named Coupled Relational Symbolic Execu-
tion (CRSE).
– We show CRSE sound for both proving programs differentially private and
for refuting differential privacy.
– We devise a set of heuristic that can help a programmer in finding violations
to differential privacy.
– We show how CRSE can help in proving and refuting differential privacy for
an interesting class of programs
2 CRSE Informally
In this section, we will motivate in an informal way CRSE through three examples
of programs showing potential errors in implementations of (supposedly) differ-
entially private algorithms. In doing this we will also presenting the notation
that will use in the rest of the paper.
2.1 Single query with wrong noise parameter.
Differential Privacy. Informally, a randomized function A is -differential privacy
if it maps two databases d1 and d2 that differ for the data of one single individual
(denoted d1 ∼ d2) to output distributions that are indistinguishable up to some
value  - usually referred to as the privacy budget - this is formalized by requiring
that the log-ratio of the two probability distributions is bounded pointwise by
, i.e. for every u,
∣∣∣ log Prx←A(d1)[x=u]Prx←A(d2)[x=u] ∣∣∣ ≤  - we will give the precise definition
in Section 3. The smaller the , the more privacy is guaranteed. A standard
way to achieve differential privacy when we are interested in a numeric query
over a dataset is to add to the query result some noise sampled from the Laplace
distribution with mean 0 and scale proportional to the sensitivity of the function
(how far the function maps two databases differing for the data of one single
individual) over  [17]. Algorithm 1 is a wrong implementation of this principle -
more in general it is a simple example of a program that is implemented with the
wrong noise parameters. Specifically, it takes in input a numeric query q with
type D → Z a database d ∈ D, and the privacy budget we want to guarantee
 ∈ R+. It then computes the query on the database, adds Laplace noise with
scale equal to 1 to the result of the query
4, and releases the result.
Algorithm 1
A buggy Laplace mechanism
Input: q: D → Z, d : D,  : R+
Output: o : Z
Required
d1 ∼ d2 ⇒ |q(d1)− q(d2)| ≤ r
1: v ← q(d)
2: ρ
$← lap(0)
3: o← v + ρ
4: return o
Fig. 1: Example 1. The algorithm is not
-DP.
This program is not -differentially
private, because it doesn’t calibrate
the Laplace noise to the sensitivity
of the query. In fact, as a precon-
dition we assert that the query q is
r-sensitive by the requirement d1 ∼
d2 ⇒ |q(d1) − q(d2)| ≤ r, assert-
ing that given two databases d1 and
d2 differing for the data of one in-
dividual the query q returns two re-
sults that are at most at distance r.
The program implementing algorithm
1 would be -differentially private if
we added noise proportional to 1r in-
stead of 1 , that is using the assign-
ment ρ
$← lapr(0) instead of ρ $← lap(0), in line 2 the algorithm.
To show formally that we have a privacy violation, accordingly to the defini-
tion of differential privacy, we need to witness a query q, two databases d1 and
d2 in the relation d1 ∼ d2, and a possible output u making the two probability
distributions distinguishable for more than . Approching this task directly is
intractable [21].
Instead, in order to do this, CRSE will execute the program in a relational
symbolic fashion and it will try to prove that in two runs of the program the
output variable has the same value and the privacy budget spent is at most .
Technically, this is implemented by considering the postcondition o1 = o2 ∧ c ≤
, where c is a distinguished variable recording the privacy budget spent. If CRSE
succeed, then the program is -differentially private. If there is an execution that
invalidates this post-condition, then we will have a candidate for a witness of
the violation.
4 We actually use the inverse of the scale as a parameter. That is the instruction
x
$←−lap(0) denotes a sample from the Laplace distribution with mean 0 and scale
1

. This will help in considering  as a budget to spend.
To avoid resorting to sampling, when CRSE executes the command for Laplace
(as in line 2), following the approximate probabilistic coupling idea from [8], it
couples the samples (ρ1, ρ2) in the two runs, and adds the constraint ρ1+k = ρ2,
for some k. It also tracks the budget spent with the constraint c = |k| ·. The in-
tuition behind this constraint is that we can ensure the two samples to be at some
distance if we pay enough budget. From this we can see that if o1 is to be equal to
o2 then k needs to be necessarily equal to v1 − v2. Since, q(d1) = v1, q(d2) = v2,
the difference v1 − v2 is bounded above by r, and we get that, in the worst case
c = r. This means that in order to achieve equality of the output variables and
hence,  differential privacy, we need to spend at least r times the budget . So,
if we are trying to use less budget, the constraints will give us a candidate for a
witness of the violation.
2.2 Two buggy Sparse Vector implementations.
Algorithm 2 A buggy Above
Threshold
Input: t,  ∈ R, d ∈ D, q[i] : D → N
Output: o : [⊥i, z,⊥n−i−1]
Required
d1 ∼ d2 ⇒ |q[i](d1)− q[i](d2)| ≤ 1
1: o← ⊥n; r ← n+ 1
2: tˆ← lap 
2
(t)
3: for (i in 1:n) do
4: sˆ← lap 
4
(q[i](d))
5: if sˆ > tˆ ∧ r = n+ 1 then
6: o[i]← sˆ; r ← i
7: return o
Algorithm 3 Another buggy Above
Threshold
Input: t,  ∈ R, d ∈ D, q[i] : D → N
Output: o ∈ {⊥,>}n
Required
d1 ∼ d2 ⇒ |q[i](d1)− q[i](d2)| ≤ 1
1: tˆ← lap 
2
(t)
2: for (i in 1:n) do
3: if q[i](d) ≥ tˆ then
4: o[i]← >
5: else
6: o[i]← ⊥
7: return o
The next two examples are variations of the same algorithm: above threshold,
a component of the sparse vector technique [28]. Given a numeric threshold, an
array of numeric queries of length n, and a dataset, this algorithm returns the
index of the first query whose result exceeds the threshold - and potentially it
should also return the value of that query. This should be done in a way that
preserves differential privacy. To do this in the right way, a program should add
noise to the threshold (even if it is not a sensitive data), add noise to each
query, compare the values, and return the index of the first query for which this
comparison succeed. The analysis of this algorithm is rather complex: it uses the
noise on the threshold as a way to pay only once for all the queries that are below
the threshold, and the noise on the queries to pay for the first and only query
that is above the threshold, if any. Due to this complex analysis, this algorithm
has been a benchmark for tools for reasoning about differential privacy [3,8,38].
Algorithm 2 has a bug making the whole algorithm not differentially private,
for values of n greater than 4. The program takes in input an array of queries
of type D → Z, a privacy budget  and a thresold t. The program initializes an
array of outputs o to all bottoms values, and a variable r to n+ 1 which will be
used as guard in the main loop. It then adds noise to the threshold, and iterates
over all the queries adding noise to their results. If one of the noised-results is
above the noisy threshold it saves the value in the array of outputs and updates
the value of the guard variable, causing it to exit the main loop. Otherwise it
keeps iterating. The bug is returning the value of the noisy query that is above
the threshold and not only its index, as done by the instruction in red in line
6 - this is indeed not enough for guaranteeing differential privacy. For n < 5
this program can be shown -differentially private by using the composition
property of differential privacy that says that the k-fold composition of -DP
programs is k-differentially private(Section 3). However, for n ≥ 5 the more
sophisticated analysis we described above fails. The proof principle CRSE will
use to try to show this program -differentially private is to prove the assertion
o1 = ι =⇒ o2 = ι ∧ c ≤ , for every ι ≤ n - the soundness of this principle
has been proved in [8]. That is, CRSE will try to prove the following assertions
(which would prove the program without bug -differentially private):
• o1 = [sˆ1,⊥, . . . ,⊥] =⇒ o2 = [sˆ1,⊥, . . . ,⊥] ∧ c ≤ 
• o1 = [⊥, sˆ1, . . . ,⊥] =⇒ o2 = [⊥, sˆ1, . . . ,⊥] ∧ c ≤ 
. . .
• o1 = [⊥, . . . , sˆ1] =⇒ o2 = [⊥, . . . , sˆ1] ∧ c ≤ 
While proving the first assertion, CRSE will first couple at line 3 the threshold
as tˆ1 + k0 = tˆ2, for k0 > 1 where 1 is the sensitivity of the queries, which is
needed to guarantee that all the query results below the threshold in one run
stay below the threshold in the other run, then, it will increase appropriately
the privacy budget by k0

2 . As a second step it will couple sˆ1 +k1 = sˆ2 in line 4.
Now, the only way for the assertion o1 = [sˆ1,⊥,⊥] =⇒ o2 = [sˆ1,⊥,⊥] to hold,
is guaranting that both sˆ1 = sˆ2 and sˆ1 ≥ t1 =⇒ sˆ2 ≥ t2 hold. But these two
assertions are not consistent with each other because k0 ≥ 1. That is, the only
way, using these coupling rules, to guarantee that the run on the right follows
the same branches of the run on the left (this being necessary for proving the
postcondion) is to couple the samples sˆ1 and sˆ2 so that they are different, this
necessarily implying the negation of the postcondition. This would not the the
case, if we were returning only the index of the query, since we can have that
both the queries are above the threshold but return different values. Indeed,
by substituting line 7 with o[i]
$←−> the program can be proven -differentially
private. So the refuting principle CRSE will use here is the one that finds a trace
on the left run such that the only way the right run can be forced to follow it is
by making the output variables different.
A second example with bug of the above threshold algorithm is shown in
Figure 3. In this example, in the body of the loop, the test is performed between
the noisy threshold and the actual value of the query on the database - that is,
we don’t add noise to the query. CRSE will use for this example another refuting
principle based on reachability. In particular, it will vacuously couple the two
thresholds at line 1. That is it will not introduce any relation between tˆ1, and tˆ2.
CRSE will then search for a trace which is satisfiable in the first run but not in
the second one. This translates in an output event which has positive probability
on the first run but 0 probability in the second one leading to an unbounded
privacy loss, and making the algorithm not -differentially private for all finite .
Interestingly this unbounded privacy loss can be achieved with just 2 iterations.
3 Preliminaries
Discrete Probability Distributions Let A be a denumerable set, a subdis-
tribution over A is a function µ : A→ [0, 1] with weight ∑a∈A µ(a) less or equal
than 1. We can think abour subdistributions as functions assigning to each sub-
set of A a probability mass. We denote the set of subdistributions over A as
sdistr(A). When a subdistribution has weight equal to 1, then we call it a dis-
tribution. We denote the set of distributions over A by distr(A). An example
of a subdistribution that we will use in the sequel is the null subdistribution
µ0 : A→ [0, 1], assigning to every element of A mass 0. Another example is the
Dirac’s distribution unit(a) : A→ [0, 1], defined for a ∈ A as
unit(a)(x) ≡
{
1 if x = a
0 otherwise
This is a distribution assigning all the mass to the element a ∈ A. The set of
subprobability distributions can be given the structure of a monad, with unit
the function unit associating with each element its Dirac’s distribution - this
is why we chose this notation. We have also a function bind : sdistr(A) →
(A → sdistr(B)) → sdistr(B) allowing us to compose subdistributions (as we
compose monads). This is defined as bind ≡ λµ.λf.λa.
∑
b∈O′
µ(b) · f(b)(a). We
will use these constructions to give a semantics to our language in Section 4.3.
We will also use the following notion of -divergence to define a notion of
approximate coupling at the end of this section.
Definition 1. Let  ≥ 0. The -divergence between two subdistributions µ1, µ2 ∈
sdistr(A), denoted by ∆(µ1, µ2), is defined as:
∆(µ1, µ2) ≡ sup
E⊆O
(
µ1(E)− exp() · µ2(E)
)
Differential Privacy Differential Privacy intuitively guarantees that compu-
tation over any two inputs differing for the data of one individual result in close
distributions over outputs. Formally, it is defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Differential Privacy [17]). Let  ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. Let
∼⊆ D ×D. An algorithm A : D → distr(O) is (, δ)-differentially private w.r.t
∼ iff ∀D ∼ D′.∀o ⊆ O.Pr[A(D) ∈ o] ≤ e Pr[A(D′) ∈ o] + δ.
The relation ∼ models which pairs of input databases should be considered
sensitive, i.e., what data should be nearly indistinguishable for an adversary.
In this work we will mostly consider the vanilla definition of differential privacy
where δ = 0. Differential privacy implies a number of interesting properties. Here
we will describe the most interesting ones for this work.
Lemma 1 (Sequential Composition [17]). Given an A1 and A2, respectively
(1, δ1)-dp and (2, δ2)-dp, their sequential composition A(d) ≡ A2(〈A1(d), d〉) is
(1 + 2, δ1 + δ2)-dp.
In the specific case of A2 being 0-d.p, for instance when A2 ignores or does not
depend on d, the property of sequential composition is called post-processing. It
intuitively means that an (, δ) differentially private answer remains such when
arbitrarly post processed, as long as the post processing does not depend on
the data. Any differentially private version of a numeric query has necessarily
to hide the difference in output of two adjacent inputs [36]. This difference in
output is captured by the following notion of sensitivity of a function.
Definition 3. Let ∼⊆ D ×D, and f : D → Z. Then f is k sensitive if |f(x)−
f(y)| ≤ k, for all x ∼ y.
The following lemma provides the first differentially private primitive.
Lemma 2 (Laplace Mechanism [17]). Let  > 0, and assume that f : D 7→ Z
is a k sensitive function with repsect to ∼⊆ D × D. Then the randomized algo-
rithm mapping D to f(D) + ν, where ν is sampled from the Laplace distribution
with scale 1 , is k-differentially private w.r.t to ∼.
Approximate Probabilistic Liftings In this section we will give the for-
mal and precise defintion of probabilistic approximate liftings and we will make
explicit their connection with differential privacy.
Definition 4. Given two sub-distributions µ1 ∈ sdistr(A), µ2 ∈ sdistr(B), a
relation Ψ ⊆ A × B, and  ∈ R, δ ∈ [0, 1], we say that µ1, µ2 are related by the
(, δ) approximate lifting of Ψ iff there exists µL, µR ∈ distr(A×B) such that:
– pi1(µL) = µ1 and pi2(µR) = µ2
– supp(µL) ∪ supp(µR) ⊆ Ψ
– ∆(µL, µR) ≤ δ
Lemma 3 (Foundamental Property of Liftings [8]). Let µ1, µ2 ∈ distr(A), , δ ≥
0. Then ∆(µ1, µ2) ≤ δ iff µ1(=),δµ2.
From Lemma 3 we can derive that an algorithm A is (, δ)-dp w.r.t to an dajcency
relation ∼ iff A(d1)(=),δA(d2) for all d1 ∼ d2. The following lemma states
another useful proof principle.
Lemma 4 (Pointwise Differential Privacy [8]). An algorithm A : D →
distr(B) is (, δ)-dp w.r.t ∼ iff there exists {δb | δb ≥ 0}b∈B such that
∑
δb ≤ δ
and A(d1)(Ψb)
,δbA(d2) for every d1 ∼ d2. Where Ψb ≡ {(x1, x2) | x1 = b =⇒
x2 = b} ⊆ B ×B.
The next lemma, finally, casts the Laplace mechanisms in terms of couplings.
Lemma 5. Let Lv1,b, Lv2,b two random variables with law Laplace distribution
with mean v1, and v2 respectively, and b as scale. Then Lv1,b{(z1, z2) | z1 + k =
z2 ∈ Z× Z}|k+v1−v2|Lv2,b, for all k ∈ Z,  ≥ 0.
4 Concrete languages
In this section we will describe the syntax and the semantics of the concrete
languages PFOR and RPFOR. We call them concrete languages, as opposed to
symbolic, as it is standard in the symbolic execution literature( [19, 25]). The
first language, PFOR, is the language in which our programs will be written in
and is a simple imperative language with for loops and random assignment. In
order to prove relational properties about them we will define RPFOR that, with
a relational semantics, will capture pairs of PFOR programs and their paired
semantics. We start off with PFOR.
4.1 PFOR syntax
E 3 e ::=v | x | a[e] | len(a) | e⊕ e
C 3 c ::=skip | c;c | x←e | a[e]←e |
x
$←−lape(e) | if e then c else c |
for (x in e:e) do c od
Fig. 2: Syntax of PFOR
PFOR is a basic FOR-like lan-
guage with array and prob-
abilistic sampling from the
Laplace distribution. The syn-
tax ispretty standard and we
present it in Figure 2. We
let n, n1, n2 range over Z. We
let e1, e2, e range over the set
of arithmetic expressions E
which is inductively defined.
Expressions are basic values
v ∈ V ≡ Z ∪ Xp, where the set Xp contains values denoting random expressions
and will be explained more at the semantic level in the next section. Program
variables are also expressions x ∈ V as well as arithmetic operations e1 ⊕ e2
where ⊕ ∈ {+,−, ∗, /}. Finally, array accesses a[e], and len(a) when a is an
array name in A. We assume V,A, and Xp to be pairwise disjoint. The set of
commands C includes assignments, array assignments, the skip command, se-
quencing, branching, and a looping construct. Finally, we also include a primitive
instruction x
$←−lape2(e1) to model random sampling from the laplace distribu-
tion.
4.2 PFOR Semantics
As mentioned above, the set Xp contains values denoting random expressions.
We call values in Xp distribution values. We will use capital letters such as
X,Y, . . . to denote arbitrary elements in Xp In Figure 3, we introduce a gram-
mar of random expressions, where X ranges over Xp and n, n1, n2 ∈ Z. The
simple constraints in the syntactic categories ra and re record that a random
value is either associated with a specific distribution, or that the computation
is conditioned on some random expression being greater than 0 or less than
or equal than 0. The former constraints, as we will see, come from branch-
ing instructions. We treat constraint lists p, p′, in Figure 3 as lists of simple
constraints and hence, from now on, we will use the infix operators :: and @,
respectively, for appending a simple constraint to a constraint and for concate-
nating two constraints. The symbol [] denotes the empty list of probabilistic
constraints. Environments in the set M, or probabilistic memories, map pro-
gram variables to values in V, and array names to elements in Array ≡ ⋃i Vi,
so the type of a memory m ∈ M is V → V ∪ A → Array. We will distin-
guish between probabilistic concrete memories in M and concrete memories
in the set Mc ≡ V → Z ∪ A →
⋃
i Zi. Probabilistic concrete memories are
meant to denote subdistributions over the set of concrete memories Mc, more
about this connection in Section 4.3. Expressions in PFOR are given meaning
through a big-step evaluation semantics specified by a judgment of the form:
〈m, e, p〉 ↓c 〈v, p′〉, where m ∈ M, e ∈ E , p, p′ ∈ P, v ∈ V. The judgments reads
as: expression e reduces to the value v and probabilistic constraints p′ in an
enviroment m with probabilistic concrete constraints p. Commands are given
meaning through a small-step evaluation semantics specified by a judgment of
the form: 〈m, c, p〉 →c 〈m′, c′, p′〉, where m,m′ ∈ M, c, c′ ∈ C, p, p′ ∈ P . The
judgment reads as: the probabilistic concrete configuration 〈m, c, p〉 steps in to
the probabilistic concrete configuration 〈m′, c′, p′〉. We call a probabilistic con-
crete configuration of the form 〈m, skip, p〉 final. A set of concrete configurations
D is called final and we denote it by Final(D) if all its concrete configurations
are final. We will use this predicate even for sets of sets of concrete configura-
tions with the obvious lifted meaning. Figure (4) shows a selection of the rules
defining these judgments.
if-false
〈m, e, p〉 ↓c 〈v, p′〉 v ∈ Z v ≤ 0
〈m, if e then c1 else c2, p〉 →c 〈m, c2, p′〉
if-true-prob
〈m, e, p〉 ↓c 〈v, p′〉 v ∈ Xp p′′ ≡ p′@v > 0
〈m, if e then c1 else c2, p〉 →c 〈m, c1, p′′〉
lap-ass
〈m, e1, p〉 ↓c 〈n1, p1〉 〈m, e2, p1〉 ↓c 〈n2, p2〉
n2 > 0 X fresh(Xp)
p′ ≡ p1@X = lapn2(n1)
〈m,x $←−lape2(e1), p〉 →c 〈m[x 7→ X], skip, p′〉
Fig. 4: PFOR selected rules
ra ::= X
$←−lapn2(n1)
re ::= n | X | re⊕ re
P 3 p ::= X = re | re > 0 | re ≤ 0 |
ra | p :: P | []
Fig. 3: Concrete probabilistic con-
straints
Most of the rules are self-explanatory
so we only describe the ones which are
non standard. Rule lap-ass handles
the random assignment. It evaluates
the mean e1 and the scale e2 of the
distribution and checks that e2 actu-
ally denotes a positive number. The
semantic predicate · fresh(·) asserts
that the first argument is drawn non
deterministically from the second ar-
gument and that it was never used before in the computation. Notice that if one
of these two expressions reduces to a probabilistic symbolic value the computa-
tion halts. Rule if-true-prob (and if-false-prob) reduces the guard of a branch-
ing instruction to a value. If the value is a probabilistic symbolic constraint then
it will nondeterministically choose one of the two branches recording the choice
made in the list of probabilistic constraints. If instead the value of the guard is
a numerical constant it will choose the right branch deterministically using the
rules if-false and if-true (not showed). As clear from the rules a run of a PFOR
program can generate many different final concrete configurations. A different
judgment of the form D⇒c D′, where D,D′ ∈ P(M×C×P ), and in particular
its transitive and reflexive closure (⇒∗c), will help us in collecting all the possible
final configurations stemmign from a computation. The only rule that defines
the judgment, Sub-distr-step, is presented in Figure 5. Rule Sub-distr-step
selects non deterministically one configuration s = 〈m, c, p〉 from D, removes s
from it, and adds to D′ all the configurations s′ that are reachable from s.
4.3 From configurations to subdistribution
Sub-distr-step
Dt ≡ {〈m′, c′, p′〉 | 〈m, c, p〉 →c 〈m′, c′, p′〉}
〈m, c, p〉 ∈ D
D′ ≡
(
D \ {〈m, c, p〉}
)
∪ Dt
D⇒c D′
Fig. 5: Sub-distr-rule
In section 3 we defined the no-
tions of lifting, coupling and
differential privacy using sub-
distributions in the form of
functions from a set of atomic
events to the interval [0, 1].
The semantics of the lan-
guages proposed so far though
only deal with subidstribu-
tions represented as set of
concrete probabilistic config-
urations. In this section we
will map the latter to the for-
mer. We start by giving two operators used to compose and define new sub-
distridbutions in the functional form, that is: unit(·), and bind(·, ·). In the
following, we use lambda notation and the denumerable sets O,O′ are uni-
versally quantified. The first one is defined as: unit : O → sdistr(O) ≡
λa.λx.
{
1 if x = a
0 otherwise
.
The second one, is defined as
bind : sdistr(O′)→ (O′ → sdistr(O))→ sdistr(O) ≡ λµ.λf.λa.
∑
b∈O′
µ(b)·f(b)(a)
In particular unit(·) takes an arbitrary element a in a set O and returns a delta
distribution centered in a. bind(·, ·) builds a new subdistribution starting from a
family an initial subdistribution and a family of conditional distributions. Using
unit(·),bind(·, ·) it is possible to give a monadic structure to the semantics of
the language as it is done in ( [9]) for the language pWhile. In Figure 6 we
define a translation function (J·; ·Kmp) and, auxiliary functions as well, between
a single probabilistic concrete configuration and a subdistribution defined using
the unit(·)/bind(·, ·) constructs. We make use of the constant subdistribution
µ0 which maps every element to mass 0, and is usually referred to as the null
subdistribution, also by lapn2(n1)(z) we denote the mass of (discrete version
of) the Laplace distribution centered in n1 with scale n2 at the point z. The
Jms; pKmp = bind(JpKp, (λso.unit(so(ms))))J[]Kp = unit([])JX = re :: p′Kp = bind(Jp′Kp, λso.bind(JreKreso , λzo.unit(X = zo :: so)))Jre > 0 :: p′Kp = bind(Jp′Kp, λso.bind(JreKreso , λzo.if (zo > 0) then unit(zo) else µ0))Jre ≤ 0 :: p′Kp = bind(Jp′Kp, λso.bind(JreKreso , λzo.if (zo ≤ 0) then unit(zo) else µ0))Jlapn2(n1)Kres = λz.lapn2(n1)(z)JnKres = unit(n)JXKres = unit(s(X))Jre1 ⊕ re2Kres = bind(Jre1Kres , λv1.bind(Jre2Kres , λv2.unit(v1 ⊕ v2)))
Fig. 6: Translation from configuration to unit(·)/bind(·, ·) representation of sub-
distribution
idea of the translation is that we can transform a probabilistic concrete memory
ms ∈ M into a distribution over fully concrete memories in Mc by sampling
from the distributions of the probabilistic variables defined in ms in the order
they were decleared which is specified by the probabilistic path constraints. To
do this we first build a substitution for the probabilistic variable which maps
them into integers and then we perform the substitution on ms. Given a set of
probabilistic concrete memories we can then turn them in a subdistribution by
summing up all the translations of the single probabilistic configurations. Indeed,
given two subdistributions µ1, µ2 defined over the same set we can always define
the subdistribution µ1 + µ2 by the mapping (µ1 + µ2)(a) = µ1(a) + µ2(a).
The following Lemma states an equivalence between these two representa-
tions of probability subdistributions. The hypothesis of the theorem involve a
judgment, m ` p, which has not been specified for lack of space but can be
found in the appendix, it deals with well-formedness of the probabilistic path
constraint p with respect to the concrete probabilistic memory m.
Lemma 6. If m ` p and {〈m, c, p〉} ⇒∗c {〈m1, skip, p1〉, . . . , 〈mn, skip, pn〉}
then
bind(Jm; pKmp, JcKC) = n∑
i=1
Jmi; piKmp
We can now hence take, in this work, the following as definition of full denota-
tional semantics of a program executed in a memory:
Definition 5. The semantics of a program c executed on memory m and proba-
bility path constraint p0 is JcKC(m0, p0) ≡ ∑
(m,skip,p)∈D
Jm; pKmp, when {〈m, c, p〉} ⇒∗c
D, Final(D), and m0 ` p0. If p0 = [] we write JcKC(m0).
4.4 RPFOR syntax
PFOR’s semantics is unary, syntactically meaning that the configurations it deals
with are characterized by memories mapping variables and arrays names to
single objects. Semantically, it means that it captures only the computation of a
program over a single memory. In order to be able to reason about a relational
property, such as differential privacy, we will build on top of it a relational
language called RPFOR with a relational semantics dealing with pair of traces.
Intuitively, an execution of a single RPFOR program represents the execution of
two PFOR programs. Inspired by the approach of [32], we extend the grammar of
PFOR with a pair constructor 〈·|·〉 which can be used at the level of values 〈v1|v2〉,
expressions 〈e1|e2〉, or commands 〈c1|c2〉. Notice that ci, ei, vi for i ∈ {1, 2}
are commands, expressions, and values in PFOR, hence nested pairing is not
allowed. This syntactic invariant is preserved by the rules handling the branching
instruction. Pair constructs are used to indicate where commands, values, or
expressions might be different in the two unary executions represented by a
single RPFOR execution. To define the semantics for RPFOR, we first extend
memories to allow program variables to map to pairs of integers, and array
variables to map to pairs of arrays. The set of expressions and commands in
RPFOR, Er, Cr are generated by the grammars:
Er 3 er ::= v | e | 〈e1|e2〉 Cr 3 cr ::= x←er | x $←−laper (er) | c | 〈c1|c2〉
where v ∈ Vr, e, e1, e2 ∈ E , c, c1, c2 ∈ C. Values can now be also pairs of unary
values, that is Vr ≡ V ∪ V2.
4.5 RPFOR semantics
In the following we will use the following projection functions b·ci for i ∈ {1, 2},
which project, respectively, the first (left) and second (right) elements of a pair
construct (i.e., b〈c1|c2〉ci = ci, b〈e1|e2〉ci = ei with bvci = v when v ∈ V), and
are homomorphic for other constructs. The semantics of expressions in RPFOR is
specified through the following judgment 〈m1,m2, e, p1, p2〉 ↓rc 〈v, p′1, p′2〉, where
m1,m2 ∈ M, p1, p2, p′1, p′2 ∈ P, e ∈ Er, v ∈ Vr. Similarly, for commands, we have
the following judgment 〈m1,m2, c, p1, p2〉 →rc 〈m′1,m′2, c′, p′1, p′2〉. Again, we use
the predicate Final(·) for configurations 〈m1,m2, c, p1, p2〉 such that c = skip,
and lift the predicate to sets of configurations as well. Intuitively a relational
probabilistic concrete configuration 〈m1,m2, c, p1, p2〉 denotes a pair of proba-
bilistic concrete states, that is a pair of subdistributions over the space of con-
crete memories. In Figure 7 a selection of the rules defining the the judgements is
presented. Most of the rules are quite natural. Notice how branching instructions
combine both probabilistic and relational nondeterminism. So, as in the case of
r-expr-1
〈m1, bec1, p1〉 ↓c 〈v1, p′1〉
〈m2, bec2, p2〉 ↓c 〈v2, p′2〉
v1, v2 ∈ Z v1 = v2
〈m1,m2, e, p1, p2〉 ↓rc 〈v1, p′1, p′2〉
r-expr-2
〈m1, bec1, p1〉 ↓c 〈v1, p′1〉
〈m2, bec2, p2〉 ↓c 〈v2, p′2〉
(∃i ∈ {1, 2}.vi 6∈ Z ∨ v1 6= v2)
〈m1,m2, e, p1, p2〉 ↓rc 〈〈v1|v2〉, p′1, p′2〉
r-if-conc-conc-true-false
〈m1,m2, e, p1, p2〉 ↓rc 〈v, p′1, p′2〉
bvc1, bvc2 ∈ Z bvc1 > 0 bvc2 ≤ 0
〈m1,m2, if e then c1 else c2, p1, p2〉 →rc
〈m1,m2, 〈bc1c1|bc2c2〉, p′1, p′2〉
r-if-prob-prob-true-false
〈m1,m2, e, p1, p2〉 ↓rc 〈v, p′1, p′2〉
bvc1, bvc2 ∈ Xp
〈m1,m2, if e then c1 else c2, p1, p2〉 →rc
〈m1,m2, 〈bc1c1|bc2c2〉, bvc1 > 0@p′1, bvc2 ≤ 0@p′2〉
r-pair-step
{i, j} = {1, 2} 〈bmci, ci, pi〉 →c 〈m′i, c′i, p′i〉
c′j = cj p
′
j = pj m
′
j = bmcj
〈m1,m2, 〈c1|c2〉, p1, p2〉 →rc
〈m′1,m′2, 〈c′1|c′2〉, p′1, p′2〉
Fig. 7: RPFOR selected rules
PFOR, we collect sets of relational configurations using the judgment R⇒rc R′
with R,R′ ∈ P(M×M× Cr × P × P ), defined by only one rule presented
in Figure 8: SUB-PDISTR-STEP. The rule picks and remove non deterministically
one relational configuration from a set and adds to it all those configurations
that are reachable from it. As mentioned before a run of a program in RPFOR
corresponds to the execution of two runs the program in PFOR. Before making
SUB-PDISTR-STEP
〈m1,m2, c, p1, p2〉 ∈ R
Rt ≡ {〈m′1,m′2, c′, p′1, p′2〉
〈m1,m2, c, p1, p2〉 →rc 〈m′1,m′2, c′, p′1, p′2〉}
R′ ≡
(
R \ {〈m1,m2, c, p1, p2〉}
)
∪ Rt
R⇒rc R′
Fig. 8: The only rule defining the ⇒rc relation.
this precise we extend projection functions to relational configurations in the
following way: b〈m1,m2, c, p1, p2〉ci = 〈mi, c, pi〉, for i ∈ {1, 2}. Projection func-
tions extend in the obvious way also to sets of relational configurations. We are
now ready to state the following lemma:
Lemma 7. Let i ∈ {1, 2} then R⇒∗rc R′ iff bRci ⇒∗c bR′ci.
5 Symbolic languages
In this section we proceed to lift the concrete languages, metioned in Section (4),
to their symbolic versions (respectively, SPFOR and SRPFOR). As it is standard
in symbolic execution literature, the first step is to extend, with symbolic values
X ∈ X , the set of values of the concrete languages, after that rules of semantics
execution will be defined. We start off by doing this for the language PFOR.
5.1 SPFOR: Syntax
Es 3 e ::= v | x | X | a[e] | len(a) | e⊕ e
Cs 3 c ::= skip | c;c | x←e | a[e]←e |
x
$←−lape(e) | if e then c else c |
for (x in e:e) do c od
Fig. 9: SPFOR syntax. X ∈ X
We now extend PFOR ex-
pressions with symbolic val-
ues X ∈ X . Syntax of SPFOR
is presented in Figure 9. As
we can see the syntax is sim-
ilar to that of PFOR except
that the set of expressions has
been increased with symbolic
values from X denoting inte-
gers. We assume Xp ∩ X = ∅. This assumption reflects the idea that symbolic
values in X do not denote unknown or sets of probability distributions but only
unknown sets of integers. The set of values is now Vs ≡ V ∪ X , we will also
need the set Vis ≡ Z ∪ X . Notice how symbolic values can very well appear in
probabilistic expressions.
5.2 SPFOR: Semantics of expressions
In order to collect constraints on symbolic values we extend configurations with
set of constraints over integer values, drawn from the set S, not to be confused
with probabilistic path constraints. The former express constraints over integer
values, for instance parameters of the distributions. The grammar of constraints
over integers and array values is presented in Figure 10a. In particular con-
Se 3 e ::= n | X | i | e⊕ e | store(e, e, e) |
select(e, e) | |e|
S 3 s ::= > | e ◦ e | s ∧ s | ¬s | ∀i.s
(a) Grammar of constraints. X ∈ X , n ∈ V.
sra ::= Y
$←−lapce(ce)
sre ::= n | X | Y | re⊕ re
SP ::= Y = re | re > 0 | re ≤ 0 | ra
(b) Grammar of symbolic probabilistic con-
straints. ce ∈ S, X ∈ X , Y ∈ Xp
straint expressions include standard arithmetic expressions with values being
symbolic or integer constants, and array selection. Actual constraints include
first order logic formulas over arithmetic expressions. Finally, probabilistic path
constraints now can also contain symbolic integer values and hence the gram-
mar gets updated to what is shown in Figure 10b. What changes with respect
to Figure 3 is that now arithmetic expressions can also include symbolic integer
values. Indeed, also probabilistic path constraints now can be symbolic. Since
values have been extended, also memories, now properly symbolic, change type
in:MSP ≡ V→ Vs ∪A→ Arrays, where Arrays ≡ {(X, v) | X ∈ X , v ∈ Vis}.
In particular, we represent arrays in memory as pairs (X, v), where v is a (con-
crete or symbolic) integer value representing the length of the array, and X is a
symbolic value representing the array contents. The content of the arrays is kept
and refined in the set of constraints by means of select(·, ·) and store(·, ·, ·) re-
lation symbols. Evaluation judgments, both for expressions and commands, will
also include a set of constraints over integers. This is because constraints can
also be generated during evaluation of expressions. We can no proceed with the
semantics of expressions.
Figure 11 shows the judgment form. The judgment is then inductively de-
fined. We only show few rules for this judgment. We briefly describe the rules
presented. Rule S-P-Op-2 applies when an arithmetic operation has both of
its operands that reduce respectively to elements Xp. Appropriately it updates
the set of probabilistic constraints. Rules S-P-Op-5 instead fires when one of
them is an integer and the other is a symbolic value. In this case only the list of
symbolic constraints needs to be updated. Finally, in rule S-P-Op-6 one of the
operands reduces to an element in Xp and the other to an element in X . We only
update the list of probabilistic constraints appropriately, as integer constraints
cannot contain symbols in Xp.
5.3 SPFOR: Semantics of commands
We can now formalize the semantics of commands of SPFOR. Again, we provide
a selection of the rules of the small step semantics in Figure 12.
(m, e, p, s) ↓SP (v, p′, s′)
S-P-Op-2
(m, e1, p, s) ↓SP (v1, p′, s′)
(m, e2, p
′, s′) ↓SP (v2, p′′, s′′)
v1, v2 ∈ Xp X fresh(Xp)
(m, e1 ⊕ e2, p, s) ↓SP (X, p′′@[X = v1 ⊕ v2], s′′)
S-P-Op-5
(m, e1, p, s) ↓SP (v1, p′, s′)
(m, e2, p
′, s′) ↓SP (v2, p′′, s′′)
{i, j} = {1, 2} vi ∈ Z vj ∈ X X fresh(X )
(m, e1 ⊕ e2, p, s) ↓SP (X, p′′, s′′ ∪ {X = v1 ⊕ v2})
S-P-Op-6
(m, e1, p, s) ↓SP (v1, p′, s′)
(m, e2, p
′, s′) ↓SP (v2, p′′, s′′)
{i, j} = {1, 2} vi ∈ X vj ∈ Xp X fresh(Xp)
(m, e1 ⊕ e2, p, s) ↓SP (X, p′′@[X = v1 ⊕ v2], s′′)
Fig. 11: SPFOR: Semantics of expressions, selected rules.
Rule S-P-If-sym-true fires when a branching instruction is to be executed
and the guard is reduced to either an integer or a value in X . In this case we can
very well proceed with the true branch recording in the set of integer constraints
the fact that the guard is greater than 0. Notice that if the guard is an integer
actually less than or equal than 0 then there will never be a ground substitution
for that set of constraints and hence this is not unsound.
In that case the rule, showed in the appendix, S-P-If-sym-false would in-
stead lead to a satisfiable constraint. Rule S-P-If-prob-false handles a branch-
ing instruction which has a guard reducing to a value in Xp. In this case we can
proceed in both branches, even though here we only show one of the two rules,
by recording the conditioning fact on the list of probabilistic constraints. Finally,
rule S-P-Lap-Ass handles probabilistic assignment. After having reduced both
the expression for the mean and the expression for the scale to values we check
that those are both either integers or symbolic integers, if that’s the case we
make sure that the scale is greater than 0 and we add a probabilistic constraints
recording the fact that the modified variable now points to a probabilistic sym-
bolic value related to a Laplace distribution. Notice that again we don’t handle
situations where the expression for the mean or the expression for the scale
reduces to a probabilistic symbolic value.
5.4 SPFOR: Collecting semantics
Semantics of SPFOR introduces two levels of nondeterminism, the first one is
given by branching instructions whose guard reduces to a symbolic value, the
second one comes from branching instructions whose guard reduces to a proba-
bilistic symbolic value. The collecting semantics of SPFOR, specified by the judg-
(m, c, p, s)→SP (m′, c′, p′, s′)
S-P-If-sym-true
(m, e, p, s) ↓SP (v, p′, s′)
v ∈ Vis
(m, if e then ctt else cff , p, s)→SP
(m, ctt , p
′, s′ ∪ {v > 0})
S-P-If-prob-false
(m, e, p, s) ↓SP (v, p′, s′)
v ∈ Xp
(m, if e then ctt else cff , p, s)
(m, cff , p
′@[v ≤ 0], s′)
S-P-Lap-Ass
(m, ea, p, s) ↓SP (va, p′, s′)
(m, eb, p
′, s′) ↓SP (vb, p′′, s′′)
X fresh(Xp) va, vb ∈ Vis
s′′′ = s′′ ∪ {vb > 0} p′′′ = p′′@[X $←−lapvb(va)]
m′ ≡ m[x 7→ X]
(m,x
$←−lapeb(ea), p, s)
(m′, skip, p′′′, s′′′)
Fig. 12: Semantics of SPFOR (selected rules)
ment with form H ⇒sp H′ (where H,H′ ∈ PMSP × SPForCmd× SP × S)
and whose only rule is specified in Figure 13, takes care of both of them. Unlike
in the deterministic case of the rule Set-Step, where only one configuration was
chosen nondeterministically from the initial set, here we select nondeterministi-
cally a (maximal) set of configurations all sharing the same symbolic constraints.
The notation D[s] ⊆H means that D is the maximal subset of configuration inH
s-p-collect
D[s] ⊆H
H′ ≡ {(m′, c′, p′, s′) | ∃(m, c, p, s) ∈ D[s] s.t. (m, c, p, s)→SP (m′, c′, p′, s′) ∧ SAT(s′)}
H ⇒sp
(
H \ D[s]
)
∪H′
Fig. 13: Rule for ⇒sp
which have s as set of constraints. That is D[s] ≡ {(m, c, p, s) | (m, c, p, s) ∈H}.
Again, we extend the notation and use H
D[s]
==⇒sp H′ when we want to make
explicit the set of symbolic configurations, D[s], that we are using to make the
step. So s-p-collect, starts from a set of configurations and reaches all of those
that are reachable from it. By reachable we mean that they have a satisfiable
set of configurations and are reachable from one of the original configurations
with only one step of the symbolic semantics. Similarly to deterministic case, the
following lemma of coverage connects the PFOR with SPFOR. The difference is
in the use of sets of configurations instead of single configurations. Notice that
in a set of constraints can appear constraints involving probabilistic symbols.
For instance if the i-th element of an array is associated with a random expres-
sion. The predicate SAT(·) does not take in consideration relations involving
probabilistic symbolic constraints but only relations involving symbolic values
denoting integers.
Lemma 8 (Probabilistic Unary Coverage). If H
D[s]
==⇒sp H′ and σ |=I D[s]
then ∃σ′,D[s′] ⊆H′ such that σ′ |=I D[s′], and σ(D[s])⇒∗p σ′(D[s′]).
Intuitively, Lemma 8 ensures us that a concrete execution is covered by a
symbolic one.
5.5 SRPFOR
We finally arrived to the last rung on this ladder of languages. The language
presented in this section is the the symbolic extension of the concrete language
RPFOR. It can also be seen as the relational extension of SPFOR. The key part
of this language’s semantics will be the handling of the probabilistic assignment.
For that construct we will provide 2 rules instead of one. The first one is the
obvious one which carries on a standard symbolic probabilistic assignment. The
second one will implement a coupling semantics on the basis of Section 3. We
start off by providing the syntax of the language.
5.6 SRPFOR: Syntax
Ers 3 esr ::= es | 〈es|es〉 | esr ⊕ esr | a[esr]
Crs 3 csr ::= cs | 〈cs|cs〉 | csr;csr | x←esr |
a[esr]←esr | x $←−lapes(esr) |
if esr then csr else csr |
for (x in esr:esr) do csr od
Fig. 14: SRPFOR syntax. es ∈ Es, cs ∈ Cs.
Figure 14 shows the semantics of
the language SRPFOR. We ex-
tended the language SPFOR with
the pairing construct, both at
the level of expressions and com-
mands. Importantly, only unary
symbolic expressions and com-
mands are admitted in the pairing
construct. This invariant is main-
tained during branching by projection functions. In fact, projection function b·ci
for i ∈ {1, 2}, extend to also relational symbolic expressions and commands in
the following way: b〈e1|e2〉ci = ei, b〈c1|c2〉ci = ci. With bvci = v, for v ∈ Vs.
Also, the projection functions behave homomorphically on the other constructs.
5.7 SRPFOR: Semantics of expressions
(m1,m2, e, p1, p2, s) ↓SRP (v, p′1, p′2, s′)
S-R-P-Lift
(m1, bec1, p1, s) ↓SP (v1, p′1, s′)
(m2, bec2, p2, s′) ↓SP (v2, p′2, s′′)
v =
{
(v1, v2) if (vi 6∈ Z, i ∈ {1, 2}) ∨ v1 6= v2
v1 otherwise
(m1,m2, e, p1, p2, s) ↓SRP (v, p′1, p′2, s′′)
Fig. 15: SRPFOR: Semantics of expressions.
As usual we provide a big-
step evaluation semantics
for expressions. The judg-
ment form and a selection
of the rules defining the
judgment are provided in
Figure 15. The set of val-
ues now is Vsrp ≡ Vs ∪
Vs
2. The only rule defin-
ing the judgment ↓SRP
is S-R-P-Lift. It project
the symbolic relational expression first on the left and evaluates it to a unary
symbolic value, potentially updating the probabilistic symbolic constraints and
the symbolic constraints. It then does the same projecting the expression on the
right but starting from the potentially previously updated constraints. Now, the
only case when the value returned is unary is when both the previous evaluation
returned equal integers, in all the other cases an element in Vs
2 is returned. So,
the relational symbolic semantics leverages on the unary semantics.
5.8 SRPFOR: Semantics of commands
CT X ::= [ · ] | CT X ;c
P ::= 〈·;c|·〉 | 〈·| · ;c〉
〈·|·〉 | 〈·;c| · ;c〉
Fig. 16: Grammars of evalu-
ation contexts
Before proceeding with the semantics of com-
mands, we need to introduce the following gram-
mars of contexts. We use evaluation contexts
to simplify the exposition of the rules since for
specific constructs such as relational probabilis-
tic assignment we will have more than one rule
we could fire. The two grammars for the eval-
uation contexts are shown in Figure 16. Notice
how P gets saturated by pairs of commands. Before proceeding we want to
make a syntactical distinction between commands. In particular, we call syn-
chronizing all the commands in Crs with the following shapes x $←−lape2(e1),
〈x $←−lape2(e1)|x′ $←−lape′2(e′1)〉. We call commands with this structure: synchro-
nizing because they allow synchronization of two runs as we will see later on. In
particular, synchronizing commands are the ones that allow the use of coupling
semantics and coupling rules. We call non synchronizing all the other commands
in Crs The semantics of commands is again provided
Non synchronizing commands In this section we provide the semantics for
non synchronizing commands. In particular we are defining a judgment for a
small-step semantics with the form in Figure 17. A selection of the rules induc-
tively defining the judgment is specified in Figure 18.
An explanation of the rules follows. Rule s-r-if-prob-prob-true-false fires
when evaluating a branching instruction. In particular, it fires when the guard
(m1,m2, c, p1, p2, s)→SRP (m′1,m′2, c′, p′1, p′2, s′)
Fig. 17: SRPFOR: Judgment form for semantics of non synchronizing commands.
m1,m2,m
′
1,m
′
2 ∈MSP, c, c′ ∈ Crs, p, p′ ∈ SP, s, s′ ∈ S.
s-r-if-prob-prob-true-false
(m1,m2, e, p1, p2, s) ↓SRP (v, p′1, p′2, s′) bvc1, bvc2 ∈ Xp
p′′1 ≡ p′1@[bvc1 > 0] p′′2 ≡ p′2@[bvc2 ≤ 0]
(m1,m2, if e then ctt else cff , p1, p2, s)→SRP (m1,m2, 〈bcttc1|bcff c2〉, p′′1 , p′′2 , s′)
s-r-if-prob-sym-true-false
(m1,m2, e, p1, p2, s) ↓SRP (v, p′1, p′2, s′) bvc1 ∈ Xp bvc2 ∈ X
p′′1 ≡ p′1@[bvc1 > 0] s′′′ ≡ s′′ ∪ {bvc2 ≤ 0}
(m1,m2, if e then ctt else cff , p1, p2, s)→SRP (m1,m2, ctt , p′′1 , p′2, s′′′)
s-r-pair-lap-skip
(m1, x
$←−lapeb(ea), p1, s)→SP (m′1, skip, p′1, s′)
(m1,m2, 〈x $←−lapeb(ea)|skip〉, p1, p2, s)→SRP (m′1,m2, 〈skip|skip〉, p′1, p2, s′)
s-r-pair-lapleft-sync
c 6≡ x $←−lape′
b
(e′a) (m2, c, p2, s)→SP (m′2, c′, p′2, s′) P ≡ 〈·|·〉
(m1,m2,P(x $←−lapeb(ea), c), p1, p2, s)→SRP (m1,m′2, 〈x $←−lapeb(ea)|c′〉, p1, p′2, s′)
s-r-pair-ctxt-1
x
$←−lapeb(ea) /∈ {c1, c2} |{c1, c2}| = 2
{1, 2} = {i, j} m′i ≡ mi (mj , cj , pj , s)→SP (m′j , c′j , p′j , s′)
c′i ≡ ci p′i ≡ pi
(m1,m2,P(c1, c2), p1, p2, s)→SRP (m′1,m′2,P(c′1, c′2), p′1, p′2, s′)
s-r-pair-ctxt-2
P 6≡ 〈·|·〉
(m1,m2, 〈c1|c2〉, p1, p2, s)→SRP (m′1,m′2, 〈c′1|c′2〉, p′1, p′2, s′)
(m1,m2,P(c1, c2), p1, p2, s)→SRP (m′1,m′2,P(c′1, c′2), p′1, p′2, s′)
Fig. 18: SRPFOR: Semantics of non synchronizing commands. Selected rules.
evaluates on both side to a probabilistic symbolic value. In this case the se-
mantics can continue with the true branch on the left run and with the false
branch on the right one. Notice that commands are projected to avoid pairing
commands appearing in a nested form. In the case where the guard of a branch-
ing instruction evaluates to a probabilistic symbolic value on the left run and
a symbolic integer value on the right one, rule s-r-if-prob-sym-true-false can
apply. The rule allows to continue on the true branch on the left run and on the
false branch on the right one. Notice that in one case the probabilistic list of
constraints is updated, while on the other the symbolic set of constraints. Rule
s-r-pair-lap-skip handles the pairing command where on the left hand side
we have a probabilistic assignment and on the right a skip instruction. In this
case, there is no hope for synchronization between the two runs and hence we
can just unarily perform the left probabilistic assignment relying on the unary
symbolic semantics. Rule s-r-pair-lapleft-sync instead applies when on the left
we have a probabilistic assignment and on the right we have another arbitrary
command. In this case we can hope to reach a situation where on the right
run another probabilistic assignment appears. Hence, it makes sense to continue
the computation unarily on the right side. Rule s-r-pair-ctxt-1 applies when a
pairing command is built out of two different unary commands neither of which
is a probabilistic assignment, or a sequence of commands. In this case we can
just rely on the unary semantics and execute one step on side. Rule s-r-pair-
ctxt-2 instead applies in all the other cases by recursively relying on the →SRP
semantics.
SRPFOR: Collecting semantics for non synchronizing commands Again
→SRP is a non deterministic semantics. The non determinism comes from the
use of probabilistic symbols as guards in branching instructions, as well as from
symbolic values used as guards. Finally the layer of non determinism given by the
relational approach which allows runs to take different branches in a branching
instruction. So, in order to collect all the possible traces stemming from such non
determinism we define a collecting semantics relating set of configurations to set
of configurations. The semantics is specified through a judgment with the form:
SR ⇒srp SR′, with SR,SR′ ∈ P(MSP ×MSP × Crs × SP × SP × S). The
only rule defining the judgment is given in Figure 19. The rule, and the auxiliary
s-r-p-collect
R[s] ⊆ SR
SR′ ≡ {(m′1,m′2, c′, p′1, p′2, s′) |
∃(m1,m2, c, p1, p2, s) ∈ R[s] s.t. (m1,m2, c, p1, p2, s)→SRP (m′1,m′2, c′, p′1, p′2, s′) ∧ SAT(s′)}
SR⇒srp
(
SR \ R[s]
)
∪SR′
Fig. 19: Rule for ⇒srp
notation R[s], is pretty similar to the one in Figure 13. The only difference is
that here sets of symbolic relational probabilistic configurations are considered
instead of symbolic (unary) probabilistic configurations.
Synchronizing commands So far all the semantics rules for SRPFOR we
presented are uniquely determined by the syntactic construct they are associated
to. Also, the rules of the→SRP semantics and, hence, also of the⇒srp semantics,
don’t deal with synchronizing commands. For those we want to be able to apply
different rules. In order to consider all the possibilities we define a new judgment
with form G G′, with G, G′ ∈ P(P(MSP ×MSP × Crs × SP × SP × S))
Proof-Step-No-Sync
SR ∈ G SR⇒srp SR′ G′ ≡
(
G \ {SR}
)
∪ {SR′}
G  G′
Proof-Step-No-Coup
(m1,m2, CT X [x $←−lapeb(ea)], p1, p2, s) ∈ SR ∈ G
(m1,m2, ea, p1, p2, s) ↓SRP (va, p′1, p′2, sa) (m1,m2, eb, p′1, p′2, sa) ↓SRP (vb, p′′1 , p′′2 , sb)
X1, X2 fresh(Xp) m′1 ≡ m1[x 7→ X1] m′2 ≡ m2[x 7→ X2]
p′′′1 ≡ p′′1@[X1 $←−lapbvbc1(bvac1)] p′′′2 ≡ p′′2@[X2
$←−lapbvbc2(bvac2)]
SR′ ≡
(
SR \ {(m1,m2, CT X [x $←−lapeb(ea)], p1, p2, s)}
)
∪ {(m′1,m′2, CT X [skip], p′′′1 , p′′′2 , s′′)}
G′ ≡
(
G \ {SR}
)
∪ {SR′}
G  G′
Proof-Step-Avoc
(m1,m2, CT X [x $←−lapeb(ea)], p1, p2, s) ∈ SR ∈ G
(m1,m2, ea, p1, p2, s) ↓SRP (va, p′1, p′2, sa) (m1,m2, eb, p′1, p′2, sa) ↓SRP (vb, p′′1 , p′′2 , sb)
X1, X2 fresh(X ) m′1 ≡ m1[x 7→ X1] m′2 ≡ m2[x 7→ X2]
SR′ ≡
(
SR \ {(m1,m2, CT X [x $←−lapeb(ea)], p1, p2, s)}
)
∪ {(m′1,m′2, CT X [skip], p′′1 , p′′2 , s′′)}
G′ ≡
(
G \ {SR}
)
∪ {SR′}
G  G′
Fig. 20: SRPFOR: Proof collecting semantics, selected rules.
In Figures 20 and 21, a selected collection of the rules defining the judgment
is presented. One of the rules defining this last judgment relies on the previ-
ously defined collecting semantics. Indeed, rule Proof-Step-No-Sync applies
when no synchronizing commands are involved, and hence there is no possible
Proof-Step-Lap-Gen
(m1,m2, CT X [x $←−lapeb(ea)], p1, p2, s) ∈ SR ∈ G
(m1,m2, ea, p1, p2, s) ↓SRP (va, p′1, p′2, sa) (m1,m2, eb, p′1, p′2, sa) ↓SRP (vb, p′′1 , p′′2 , sb)
s′ ≡ sb ∪ {bvbc1 = bvbc2, bvbc1 > 0} m1(c) = E′ = m′2(c)
E′′, X1, X2,K,K
′ fresh(X ) m′1 ≡ m1[x 7→ X1][c 7→ E′′], m′2 = m2[x 7→ X2][c 7→ E′′]
m() = E s′′ ≡ s′ ∪ {X1 +K = X2,K ≤ K′,K′ · E = bvbc1, E′′ = E′ + |bvac1 − bvac2| ·K′}
p′′′1 ≡ p′′1@[X1 $←−lapbvbc1(bvac1)] p′′′2 ≡ p′′2@[X2
$←−lapbvbc2(bvac2)]
SR′ ≡
(
SR \ {(m1,m2, CT X [x $←−lapeb(ea)], p1, p2, s)}
)
∪ {(m′1,m′2, CT X [skip], p′′′1 , p′′′2 , s′′)}
G′ ≡
(
G \ {SR}
)
∪ {SR′}
G  G′
Proof-Step-If
ρ = (m1,m2, CT X [if e then c1 else c2], p1, p2, s) ∈ SR ∈ G
(m1,m2, e, p1, p2, s) ↓SRP (v, p′1, p′2, s′) {⊕1,⊕2} = {>,≤}
|= s′ =⇒ bvc1 ⊕i 0 ⇐⇒ bvc2 ⊕i 0
SR
{ρ}
==⇒srp SR′ G′ ≡
(
G \ {SR}
)
∪ {SR′}
G  G′
Proof-Step-Other-Cmds
ρ = (m1,m2, CT X [c], p1, p2, s) ∈ SR ∈ G
c 6= if · then · else · SR {ρ}==⇒srp SR′
G′ ≡
(
G \ {SR}
)
∪ {SR′}
G  G′
Fig. 21: SRPFOR: Proof collecting semantics, other rules
coupling rule to be applied. Before proceeding with the explanation of the other
rules there is the need to explain the variable c which is used in the latter rules.
The variable c is a variable that symbolically counts the current level of privacy
in the current relational execution. The variable gets increased when the rule
Proof-Step-Lap-Gen fires. We have chosen to omit a similar ghost counter
variable for δ so rules would be more readable. The variable gets increased also
when the rules handling the pairing command 〈x $←−lapeb(ea)|x $←−e′ae′b〉. This lat-
ter rule is shown in Appendix. This symbolic counter variable is useful when
trying to prove equality of certain variables without spending more than a spe-
cific budget. In the set of sets of configurations G, a set of configurations, SR,
is nondeterministically chosen. Among elements in SR a configuration is also
nondeterministically chosen. Using contexts we check that in the selected con-
figuration the next command to execute is the probabilistic assignment. After
reducing to values both the mean and scale expression, and verified (that is,
assumed in the set of constraints) that in the two runs the scales have the
same value, the rule adds to the set of constraints a new element, that is,
E′′ = E′ + |bvac1 − bvac2| · K ′, where K,K ′, E′′ are fresh symbols denoting
integers and E′ is the symbolic integer to which the budget variable c maps
to. Notice that c needs to point to the same symbol in both memories. This
because it’s a shared variable tracking the privacy budget spent so far in both
runs. This new constraint increases the budget spent. The other constraint added
is the real coupling relation, that is X1 + K = X2. Where X1, X2 are fresh in
X . Later, K will be existentially quantified in order to search for a proof of -
indistinguishability. Rule Proof-Step-Avoc does not use any coupling rule but
treats the samples in a purely in a symbolic manner. It intuitively asserts that
the two samples are drawn from the distributions and assigns to them arbitrary
integers free to vary on the all domain of Thai Laplace distribution. Finally,
Proof-Step-No-Coup applies to synchronizing commands as well. It does not
add any relational constraints to the samples. This rules intuitively means that
we are not correlating in any way the two samples. Notice that since we are not
using any coupling rule we don’t need to check that the scale value is the same
in the two runs as it is requested in the previous rule. We could think of this as
a way to encode the relational semantics of the program in an expression which
later can be fed in input to other tools. The main difference with the previous
rule is that here we treat the sampling instruction symbolically and that’s why
the fresh symbols are in Xp denoting full distributions, while in the previous
rule the fresh symbols are in X denoting sampled integers, even though in no
particular relation. When the program involves a synchronizing command we
basically fork the execution when it’s time to execute it. In particular the set of
configurations gets to continue the computation in different ways, one for every
rule applicable.
5.9 Coverage
The coverage lemma can be extended also to the relational setting. To do that
though we need to consider only the fragment of the semantics that only uses
the rules Proof-Step-No-Sync, and Proof-Step-No-Coupl. We denote this
fragment with the notation =⇒∼ . While the semantics that uses only the following
rules will be denoted by
∼
=⇒: Proof-Step-Lap-Gen, Proof-Step-Other-Cmds,
Proof-Step-If . A similar relational coverage Lemma holds for the⇒srp seman-
tics and hence it trivially extends to =⇒∼ .
Lemma 9 (Probabilistic Relational Coverage). If SR
R[s]
==⇒srp SR′ and
σ |=I R[s] then ∃σ′,R[s′] ∈ SR′ such that R[s′] ⊆ SR′, σ′ |=I R[s′], and
σ(R[s])⇒∗rp σ′(R[s′]).
6 Derivations
The language of relational assertions is defined using first order predicate logic
formulas involving relational program expressions and logical variables in an
unspecified set LogVar. The interpretation of a relational assertions is naturally
defined as a subset of Mc ×Mc, that is the set of pairs of memories modelling
the assertion. We will let capital greek letters such as Φ, Ψ . . . range of the set of
relational assertions. We will also need an additional substituting function J·K·
taking an assertion and a memory in input and returning the assertion where
all the program variables have been substituted with the values to which the
memory maps variables to. That is, given a memory, relational or unary, m and
an assertion, relational or unary, Φ, JΦKm is a constraint. More details can be
found in [19].
Definition 6. Let Φ, Ψ be relational assertions, c ∈ Cr, I : LogVar→ R defined
on , δ. We say that, Φ yields Ψ through c within  and δ under I (and we write
I ` c : Φ (,δ)−−−→ Ψ) iff
– {{{〈mI1 ,mI2 , c, [], [], JΦKmI 〉}}} ∗ G
– ∃Hsr = {Hs1, . . . ,Hst} ∈ G such that
• Final(Hsr)
• ∀〈m1,m2, skip, p1, p2, s〉 ∈
⋃
D∈Hsr D.∃k.
s =⇒ JΨ ∧ c ≤  ∧ δc ≤ δK〈m1|m2〉
where mI ≡ 〈mI1 |mI2〉 = 〈m′I1 [c 7→ 0][δc 7→ 0]|m′I2 [c 7→ 0][δc 7→ 0]〉, m′I1 ,
and m′I2 are fully symbolic memories, and k = k1, k2, . . . are the symbols
generated by the rules for synchronizing commands.
The idea of this definition is to automatize the proof search. When proving
differential privacy we will usually consider Ψ as being equality of the output
variables in the two runs and Φ as being our preconditions.
7 Soundness of proofs and refutations
In this section we will connect the material presented in Section 6 with the one
presented in Section 3.
7.1 Soundness
Lemma 10. Let c ∈ Cr with o its output variable taking values over the set O.
Let c ∈ Cr. If I ` c : d1 ∼ d2 (,δ)−−−→ o1 = o2 then c is (,δ)-differentially private.
Also, if I ` c : d1 ∼ d2 (,δ)−−−→ o1 = ι =⇒ o2 = ι forall ι ∈ O then c is
(,δ)-differentially private.
7.2 Refutations through pure semantics
Lemma 11. {{{〈m1,m2, c, [], [], JΦK〈m1|m2〉〉}}} ˆG, and Hs ∈ H ∈ G and,
∃σ |=Z s such that ∆(Jbcc1KC(σ(m1)), Jbcc2KC(σ(m2))) > δ then c is not dif-
ferentially private.
Proof. It suffices to notice that the two distributions Jbcc1KC(σ(m1)), and Jbcc2KC(σ(m2))
violate the δ bound of the ∆ distance. Then σ(m1) and σ(m2) are counterex-
amples.
8 Strategies for counterexample finding
Lemma 11 is hard to use to find counterexamples because given two arbitrary
probability distributions computing their -divergence is hard in general. For
this reasons we will now describe three strategies that might help in reduc-
ing the effort in counterexample finding. This strategies help in isolating traces
that could potentially lead to violations. For this we need first some nota-
tion. Given a set of constraints s we define the triple Ω = 〈Ω1, Ω2, C(k)〉 ≡
〈bsc1, bsc2, s \ (bsc1 ∪ bsc2)〉. Given a relational symbolic configuration we can
always split its symbolic set of constraints along the Ω pattern. Given a set of
constraint s of a relational trace its Ω1 projection is the set of constraints gen-
erated by the branching instruction performed by the left run, simlarly for Ω2.
Finally, C(k) is the set of relational constraints coming from either precondi-
tions or invariants or, from the rule PROOF-STEP-LAP-GEN. The, potentially empty,
vector k = K1, . . .Kn is the set of fresh symbols K generated by that rule. We
sometimes abuse notation and consider Ω also as a set of constraints given by
the union of its first, second and third projection. Given a set of constraints
we will also consider it as a single proposition given by the conjunction of its
elements.
8.1 A simplifying assumption on traces and events
In this section we will formalize the main assumption that we will use in order
to apply the strategies for counterexample finding presented in the following two
subsections.
Assumption 1 Consider c ∈ Cr with output variable o, then c is such that
{{{〈m1,m2, c, [], [], s〉}}} ∗ G and
∀H〈Ω1, C(k), Ω2〉 ∈ H ∈ G.Final(H) ∧ o1 = o2 =⇒ Ω1 ⇔ Ω2
The idea of this assumption is to consider only programs for which it is necessary,
for the output variable on both runs to assume the same values, that the two
runs follow the same branches. That is, if the two output variables are different
then the two executions must have, at some point, taken different branches.
The following definition will be used to distinguish relational traces which are
reachable on one run but not on the other. We call this traces orthogonal.
Definition 7. A final relational symbolic trace is orthogonal when its set of
constraints is such that ∃σ.σ 6|= Ω2 and σ |= Ω1∧C(k). That is a trace for which
the following formula is satisiable: ¬(Ω1 ∧ C(k) =⇒ Ω2)
The next definition, instead, will be used to isolate relational traces for which
it’s not possible that the left one is executed but the right one is not. We call
this traces specular.
Definition 8. A final relational symbolic trace is specular when its set of con-
straints is such that ∃k.Ω1 ∧ C(k) =⇒ Ω2.
The constraint Ω1 ∧ C(k) includes all the constraints coming from the left pro-
jection’s branching of the symbolic execution and all the relational assumptions
such as the adjacency condition, and all constraints added by the potentially fired
PROOF-STEP-LAP-GEN rule. A specular trace is such that its left projection con-
straints plus the relational assumptions imply the right projection constraints.
We will now describe three strategies that will be used to isolate relational sym-
bolic traces potentially leading to counterexamples.
8.2 Strategy A
In this strategy CRSE uses only the rule PROOF-STEP-AVOC for sampling instruc-
tions, also this strategy searches for orthogonal relational traces. Under assump-
tion 1, if this happens for a program then it must be the case that the progam can
output one value on one run with some probability but the same value has 0 prob-
ability of being output on the second run. This very fact implies that for some
input the program has an unbounded privacy loss. To implement this strategy
CRSE looks for orthogonal relational traces 〈m1,m2, skip, p1, p2, Ω〉 such that:
∃σ.σ |= Ω1 ∧C(k) but σ 6|= Ω2. Notice that using this strategy k will always be
empty, as the rule used for samplings does not introduce any coupling between
the two samples. Hence, we don’t need to quantify over those symbols, and we
can just write C. The set C though might very well be non empty, because it
will potentially include relational assumptions, e.g. adjacency of the inputs.
8.3 Strategy B
This strategy symbolically executes the program in order to find a specular
trace for which no matter how we relate, within the budget, the various pairs
of samples Xi1, X
i
2 in the two runs - using the relational schema X
i
1 + Ki = X
i
2
- the postcondition is always false. That is CRSE looks for specular relational
traces 〈m1,m2, skip, p1, p2, Ω〉 such that:
∀k.
[
(Ω1 ∧ C(k) =⇒ Ω2) ∧ Jc ≤ )K〈m1|m2〉] =⇒ Jo1 6= o2K〈m1|m2〉
8.4 Strategy C
This strategy looks for relational traces for which the output variable takes the
same value on the two runs but too much of the budget was spent. That is CRSE
looks for traces 〈m1,m2, skip, p1, p2, Ω〉 such that:
∀k.
[
Ω1 ∧ C(k) ∧Ω2 =⇒ Jo1 = o2K〈m1|m2〉] =⇒ Jc > K〈m1|m2〉
9 Examples
In this section we will review the examples presented in Section 2 and variations
thereof to show how CRSE works.
9.1 Unsafe sparse vector implementation: Algorithm 2
In this section we will describe in more detail how CRSE deals with Algorithm 2.
The algorithm is not -differentially private. An easy fix would be to add noise
the output too, that is, substitute line 7 with o[i]←lap 
2
(q[i](D)), giving us an
2-differentially private algorithm. Algorithm 2 satisfies assumption 1 because
it outputs the whole array o which takes values of the form ⊥i, t or ⊥n for
1 ≤ i ≤ n and t ∈ R. The array, hence, encodes the whole trace. So if two runs
of the algorithm output the same value it must be the case that they followed
they same branching instructions. Let’s first notice that the algorithm is trivially
 differentially private, for any , when the number of iterations n is less than
or equal to 4. Indeed it’s enough to apply the sequential composition theorem
and get the obvious bound 4 · n. CRSE can prove this by applying the rule
Proof-Step-Lap-Gen n times, and then choosing K1, . . . ,Kn all equal to 0.
This would imply the statement of equality of the output variables spending
less than . Hence, it is obvious that if there is a potential counterexample it
can only be found after 4 iterations. In fact, a potential counterexample can
be found in 5 iterations. If we apply strategy B to this algorithm and follow
the relational symbolic trace that applies the rule Proof-Step-Lap-Gen for all
the samplings we can isolate the relational specular trace showed in Figure 2,
which corresponds to the left execution following the false branch for the first
four iterations and then following the true branch and setting the fifth element
of the array to the sampled value. Let’s denote the respective final relational
configuration by 〈m1,m2, skip, p1, p2, s〉. The set of constraints is as follows:
s = 〈Ω1, C(k), Ω2〉 =
〈{T1 > S11 , T1 > S21 , T1 > S31 , T1 > S41 , T1 ≤ S51},
{T1 + k0 = T2, S11 + k1 = S12 , S21 + k2 =S22 ,
S31 + k3 = S
3
2 , S
4
1 + k4 = S
4
2 , S
5
1 + k5 = S
5
2 ,
E6 = k0

2
+

4
4∑
i=1
ki . . . },
{T2 > S12 , T2 > S22 , T2 > S32 , T2 > S42 , T2 ≤ S52}〉
with m1(c) = m2(c) = E6,m1(o) = [S
1
1 , . . . , S
5
1 ],m2(o) = [S
1
2 , . . . , S
5
2 ],m1(t) =
T1,m2(t) = T2. We can see that strategy B applies, because
|= ∀k.
[
(Ω1 ∧ C(k) =⇒ Ω2) ∧ Jc ≤ )K〈m1|m2〉] =⇒ Jo1 6= o2K〈m1|m2〉
holds. The probability associated with these two traces can be expressed as:
Γj(q(Dj), , T, o) ≡
∫ +∞
−∞
pdflapT
2
(ρ)
( 4∏
i=1
cdflap
q[i](Dj)

4
(ρ) Pr[sˆ5j = o∧sˆ5j ≥ ρ]
)
dρ
where j ∈ {1, 2} denotes which run (left or right) we are considering, q is the
vector of queries such that | q[i](D1) − q[i](D2) |≤ 1 for adjacent databases
D1, D2 and 1 ≤ i ≤ 5. Also, pdflapT
2
(ρ) denotes the probability density at the
point ρ of a random variable with Laplace distribution with mean T and scale
2
 , and, finally, cdflap
q[i](Dj)

4
(ρ) denotes the cumulative distributive function at
the point ρ, of a random variable with Laplace distribution with mean q[i](Dj)
and scale 4 . Let’s define Γ (q(D1), q(D2), , T, o) ≡ Γ1(q(D1),,T,o)Γ2(q(D1),,T,o) , then we can
see that Γ ([00001], [11110], 1, 0, 0) > e1. Where
[q[1](D1), q[2](D1), q[3](D1), q[4](D1), q[5](D1)] =
[00001] and,
[q[1](D2), q[2](D2), q[3](D2), q[4](D2), q[5](D2)] =
[11110]. This pair of traces is, in fact, the same that has been found in [28] for a
sligthly more general version of Algorithm (2). Strategy B selects this relational
trace because, as already noticed in [8] for a different version of the algorithm,
in order to make sure that the traces follow the same branches, the coupling
rules enforce necessarily that the two samples released are different, preventing
the CRSE to prove equality of the output variables in the two runs.
9.2 Unsafe sparse vector implementation: Algorithm 3
Algorithm 3 also satisfies assumption 1: that is, the output encodes univocally
the whole history of the trace, and hence every trace corresponds injectively to
an event. The algorithm is trivially  differentially private for one iteration. This
because, intuitively, adding noise to the threshold protects the result of the query
as well at the branching instruction, but only for one iteration, after that there
is no resampling. Indeed, the algorithm is not -differentially private, for any
finite  already at the second iteration, and a witness for this can be found using
CRSE. We can see this using strategy B. Thanks to this strategy we will isolate
a relational orthogonal trace, similarly to what has been found in [28] for the
same algorithm. CRSE will unfold the loop twice, and it will scan all relational
traces to see if there is an orthogonal trace. In particular, the relational trace
that corresponds to the output o1 = o2 = [⊥,>], that is the the trace with set
of constraints 〈Ω1, C(k), Ω2〉 =
〈{T1 > q1d1, T1 ≤ q2d1},
{|q1d1 − q1d2| ≤ 1, |q2d1 − q2d2| ≤ 1}
{T2 > q1d2, T2 ≤ q2d2}〉
Fig. 22: Two runs of Algorithm 2 for
5 iterations
Since the vector k is empty we can
omit it and just write C. It is easy to
see now that the following sigma: σ ≡
[q1d1 7→ 0, q2d1 7→ 1, q1d2 7→ 1, q2d2 7→ 0],
proves that this relational trace is orthog-
onal: that is σ |= Ω1 ∧ C, but σ 6|= Ω2.
Indeed if we consider two inputs D1, D2
and two queries q1, q2 such that: q1(D1) =
q2(D2) = 0, q2(D1) = q1(D2) = 1 we
get that the probability of outputting the
value o = [⊥,>] is positive in the first run,
but it is 0 on the second. This implies that
the algorithm can merely be proven to be
∞-differentially private.
A safe sparse vector implementation As
already mentioned two variations of Algorithm 2 can be proven secure. The
first one substitutes o[i]
$←−lap 
2
(q[i](D)) in place of line 7, while the second one
substitutes o[i]←>. The former version can be proven 2-dp, while the latter:
-dp. We will explain a proof of this last statement for a constant n, for example
5. The proof presented is based on that in [8], but will have a relational symbolic
execution style instead of an apRHL+ one. CRSE will try to prove the following
postconditions:
1. o1 = [>,⊥, . . . ,⊥] =⇒ o2 = [>,⊥, . . . ,⊥] ∧ c ≤ 
2. o1 = [⊥,>, . . . ,⊥] =⇒ o2 = [⊥,>, . . . ,⊥] ∧ c ≤ 
3. o1 = [⊥, . . . ,>,⊥] =⇒ o2 = [⊥, . . . ,>,⊥] ∧ c ≤ 
4. . . .
5. o1 = [⊥, . . . ,⊥,>] =⇒ o2 = [⊥, . . . ,⊥,>] ∧ c ≤ 
When trying to prove the i-th one the only interesting iteration will be the i-th
one. This because all the others the postcondition will be vacuously true, and
also the budget spent will be k0

2 , the one spent for the threshold, and for all the
other sampling instruction we can spend 0 by just setting kj = q[j](D2)−q[j](D1)
for all j 6= i, that is by couplin in this way the samples: sˆ1 + kj = sˆ2, with
kj = q[j](D2)− q[j](D1), spending |kj + q[j](D2)− q[j](D1)| = 0. So, at the i-th
iteration the samples are coupled sˆ1 + ki = sˆ2, with ki = 1. So if sˆ1 ≥ tˆ1 then
also sˆ2 ≥ tˆ2, and also, if sˆ1 < tˆ1 then also sˆ2 < tˆ2. This implies that at th i-th
iteration we enter on the right run the true branch iff we enter the true branch
on the left one. This by spending |ki + q[i](D2)− q[i](D1)| 4 ≤ 2 4 . For a total of
.
Unsafe Laplace mechanism: Algorithm 1 Algorithm 1 is not  differentially
private for any finite . The intuition is that not enough noise is added to hide
the difference of the result of a query applied to two adjacent databases. This
translates in any possible potential proof based on the coupling rules in using
too much of the budget. The program of Algorithm 1 has only one possible
final relational trace: 〈m1,m2, skip, p1, p2, 〈Ω1, C(k, Ω2)〉〉. Since there are no
branching instructions Ω1 = {b2Ec1 > 0} and Ω2 = ∅, where m1() = m2() =
E. Since there is one sampling instruction C(k) will include the following set
of constraints {|Qd1 − Qd2| ≤ 1, R1 + K = R2, Ec =| K | ·2 · K ′ · E,O1 =
R1 +Qd1, O2 = R2 +Qd2, Ec = K
′ ·E}, with m1(o) = O1,m2(o) = O2,m1(c) =
m2(c) = Ec. Intuitively we can see that, given this set of constraints, if it
has to be the case that O1 = O2 then, Qd1 − Qd2 = K. But Qd1 − Qd2 can
be 1 and hence, Ec is at least 2. This tells us that if we want to equate the
two output variables we need to spen at least twice the budget. Any relational
input satisfying the precondition will give us a counterexample, provided the
two projections are different.
A safe Laplace mechanism By substituting line 2 in Algorithm 1 with ρ
$←−lap(0)
we get an -dp algorithm. Indeed when executing that line CRSE would generate
the following constraint p1+k0 = p2∧ | k0+0−0 |≤ k1∧o1 = v1+p1∧o2 = v2+p2.
Which by instantiating k = 0, k1 = v2 − v1 implies o1 = o2 ∧ c ≤ .
10 Related Works
The closest work to ours is [3] where authors devise a decision logic for differential
privacy. The logic allows to soundly prove or disprove  and (, δ) differential
privacy by encoding the semantics of the progam into a decidable fragment of
the first-order theory of the reals with exponentiation. The programs considered
don’t allow assignemnts to real and integer variables inside the body of while
loops. Other two works very related to ours are [16] and [10]. Their approach
to finding counterexamples to differential privacy differs from ours in two main
ways. First of all they use a statistical approach by approximating the output
distributions of the program on two related inputs and then smartly checking
whether for some events these output distributions provide an out of bound ratio.
Secondly they are by nature numerical methods providing results stating that
an algorithm is not  differential private for some actual concrete . These kind
of results obviously imply that the algorithm is not differentially private for all
other concrete ′ such that ′ > , but they can only suggest that the algorithm
is not private for also the ′, such that ′ < , if that is indeed the case. Our
work instead is a purely symbolic technique which provides results stating that
an algorithm is not -differentially private for any finite . An advantage of
our approach is obviously the speed of the analysis which does not require any
sampling. In [27] authors add model checking to the tools for counterexample
finding to differential privacy. The main difference with our work is that, as
usual, model checking analyzes a model of the code and not directly the code.
Also, in the specific case of the sparse vector algorithm family, their work seem
to be able to handle only a finite number of iterations.
This work can be seen as a non trivial probabilistic extension of the frame-
work presented in [19], where sampling instructions in the relational symbolic
semantics are handled through an adaptation, in a symbolic execution frame-
work, of the apRHL+ rules first presented in [8]. Their logic proves judgments
implying differential privacy but does not help in finding counterexamples when
the program is not private. This work is also close to [1] where authors devised a
framework to automatically discover proofs of privacy using coupling rules, but
again thier work does not help in refuting privacy of buggy programs.
11 Conclusion and Future Work
In this work we presented CRSE: a symbolic execution engine framework which
integrates relational reasoning and probabilistic couplings. The framework al-
lows both proving differential privacy of the most known differentially private
algorithms, and refutation of buggy versions thereof which are particularly trick
to distinguish from the correct ones. While refuting it is also able isolate traces
and events which leads to counterexamples to differnetial privacy. When prov-
ing CRSE uses a similar approach to apRHL+ but follows a strong postcondion
approach instead of the more standard weak precondition style of proof, as it
is common in symbolic execution style of proofs. CRSE uses refuting principles,
or strategies, to isolate potentially dangerous traces. Of the presented strategies
only one is sound with respect to counterexample finding, while the other two
apply when the algorithm cannot be proven differentially private by any combi-
nation of the rules. In this second case though CRSE provides counterexamples
which agree with other refutation oriented results in literature. Future work in-
cludes interfacing more efficiently CRSE with numeric solvers to find maximums
of ratios of probabilities of traces.
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